Thank you for sharing this, that is a really clear explanation!
I know this isn't too relevant for what you actually say here, but do you think moral rationalism entails that whether theism is true can be decided a priori? After all, theism, if true, is usually thought to be necessarily true. But it doesn't seem like you should be able to be certain about theism or atheism a priori (unless there's something incoherent about one of the views).
Chapter 2 explores this more, and argues - a priori - that there are no necessary beings. (It remains an open question whether a contingent deity exists though.)
Thank you for sharing this, that is a really clear explanation!
I know this isn't too relevant for what you actually say here, but do you think moral rationalism entails that whether theism is true can be decided a priori? After all, theism, if true, is usually thought to be necessarily true. But it doesn't seem like you should be able to be certain about theism or atheism a priori (unless there's something incoherent about one of the views).
Chapter 2 explores this more, and argues - a priori - that there are no necessary beings. (It remains an open question whether a contingent deity exists though.)
Interesting, I'll have to read that then:)