I never bothered to read up on anti-natalism, and after reading this I’m only thinking one thing: are their arguments really this terrible? Knowing your writing, Richard, I wouldn’t accuse you of grossly misrepresenting their views but by golly, if this is all there is to them, why on earth would anyone take them seriously?
My observation has been that some people have really miserable lives and then intuitively understand nothing to be better than any amount of potential harm.
One anti-natalist philosopher has a condition where he literally can’t feel happiness lol.
I mean the intuition for their axiom isn’t impossible to cultivate, it’s just very bizarre and contrary to your Humanity. Well, so is our society.
I'd argue that it's important to distinguish obligation from the question of what is a desierable outcome. But that may touch on deep differences we have in moral foundations.
Those certainly make it clear that you think it is wrong to compell people to do these things. But (perhaps unclearly) I meant seperate moral obligation "you ought to do X" from the claim that "the world would be better (in the morally relevant sense) if you did X." I guess the easiest way to realize this is just to accept a notion of the superogatory -- (though I had in mind something a bit more extreme than that..like taking most things to be superogatory).
I think it's really important to distinguish what we have most moral reason to do (which I take to go along with what would produce morally better outcomes) vs what others can reasonably expect or demand, or blame you for failing to do. I take supererogatory actions to be ones that you "ought" to do in the first sense without being required (in the second sense). I think a lot of good actions (including procreative ones) are supererogatory in this way -- not obligatory, but still very much worth doing!
Yes, I agree completely. Though I'd go further and deny there is any principled notion of "reasonably expect/demand" at all (in a moral sense obviously we fabricate social norms).
Somewhat disagree with the whole "there should be no pressure to have children". Feels like a hand-waving away of an uncomfortable conclusion. No--life being preferable over not-having-lived does necessarily constitute that people have an obligation to create more life. You disagree, why? Because of some deontological invocation of 'consent'/'bodily-autonomy'? As with vaccines, this is a poor and politically motivated argument. If it is for the greater good we can forgo consent. Consent is a proxy to what actually matters--not harming people, making people more happy. But by not having children you are quite literally depriving the world of happiness that would've been. This is harm, unless you accept Benatar's asymmetry.
This obligation, as with any healthy societal norm, should not be blindly dogmatically applied to every woman and applied without nuance. Polite lies like "women without children are just as equal as women with children" can be employed in proper social contexts as long as the underlying truth is implied by society, its culture and structures. Many women and men don't/won't have children and we shouldn't paint them as irredeemable villains. Being a worse person in a certain facet doesn't make you worth nothing. They are entirely capable of leading fulfilling lives. Worth less != worthless.
But we certainly should be a very pro-natal society. Relative to what we are now, we should be EXTREMELY pro-natal. Having children should be seen as a moral duty, much as it was in religious eras. This is a responsibility that must come with rights. Mothers need to be given far more social status than they are given right now. Men need to be made worthy of being fathers.
What's your view of kidney donation and other forms of extreme altruism?
We don't, in general, hold that people have a "moral duty" to do every good thing that they could conceivably do. Moreover, I think there are good reasons for that: personal autonomy is vital for people to be able to live their best lives. So I think (on consequentialist grounds) that we should be very wary of excessive or oppressive moral "pressure" on people to make pro-social decisions against their personal interests and inclinations. I think we should very strongly prefer to shape society in ways that *encourage* and *incentivize* people to make pro-social decisions, rather than bullying them into it.
I could understand someone disagreeing with this, and thinking that we need more across-the-board pressure to do good/altruistic things. I suspect that would be counterproductive, especially from a political or movement-building perspective (who wants to join the morality police? ick.). But I especially think it would be inconsistent to selectively claim a "duty" to engage in this one kind of altruism but not others (like kidney donation).
The difference between your counterexamples and the pro-natalist view is that failing to encourage people to have children could ultimately lead to the collapse of society. Not donating a kidney or money to effective altruism doesn’t carry that kind of existential risk.
Also, a strong pro-natalist stance doesn’t require imposing duties or acting like a morality police. Think of it like society’s attitude toward smoking: you’re free to smoke, but most people agree it’s harmful. Over time, this consensus has led to a decline in smoking (setting aside the vaping trend).
That’s a good start. I sensed you had a position like that since you are obviously more pro than anti-natalist but I wanted to provide some stronger pro-natalist considerations.
I don’t really clearly understand the difference between “coercion” and “social norms”. Most people are just gonna fall in line with society—and I want society to be largely pro-natalist with a fair degree of moral urgency. The fact our world is currently quite anti-natalist in design and presentation means I must at least consider you directionally correct.
Sorry for not responding btw. Tbh, I *do* kinda think you have an obligation to donate a kidney if you’re in perfect health. I think a better healthy harmonious society would promote behavior like donating blood just instinctively. Not to mention animal ethics. Our world is quite rotten when you think about it, but morality is a matter of economics and I can chalk most of these ills up to insufficient luxury. Anti-natalism on the other hand is not a social ill we can simply “tolerate”.
As the other user @Yuyu said there is indeed a difference between donating a kidney and literally birthing the future generation. One will save society, one will not. But I don’t like to answer via deflection.
I feel that you have neglected the likelihood of certain individuals being born into a life with the near certainty of chronic illness, generational hardship, or mental health issues.
Also, I would like to critique your intro. Yes, children are often happy at a park or playground, but even for the children that have the privilege of that experience it is only a few hours of the week, and life extends far beyond childhood.
I cannot deny that for many the good in life does outweigh the bad, but for many it is quite the opposite. I personally have worked hard since setting out on my own to improve my life and I would say my quality of life is overall good now, but for several of the folks I know this is not the case.
In a more ideal world where opportunity presented itself equally to everyone regardless of their demographic, where exploitation wasn't rampant, where people took care of one another perhaps I would choose to have children, but that is simply not the world we live in.
People are greedy and although there are more than enough resources to go around they are hoarded and made a commodity. This is a complex topic all its own, but simply look at the decline in birth rates across the globe. People (women in particular) are choosing to not have babies, and it's not because they are selfish, but because their eyes are open as one of the most exploited demographics.
The main reasons I see any of my peers reproducing is because of societal pressure, ignorance, or because they are privileged enough to fulfill their desires of having a baby. Anyways, we all obviously have biases, but I wanted to present mine as food for thought in a rational manner without making anyone feel attacked or offended.
See footnote 1 - I agree that people who feel their lives are negative probably shouldn't reproduce! (But I think most people are overall happy to exist.)
(People are wealthier and more free than ever before, so it doesn't make sense to posit increasing hardship, oppression, or exploitation, etc. as explaining the trend. Those bad things have objectively massively decreased over the past century. What has increased is our opportunity to do other valuable things with our time.)
I don't think embryos are people, and I think there's a reasonable case for prioritizing the interests of existing people (esp. preventing *harm* to individuals) over the interests of possible people in coming into existence. See my discussion of "failing to create" in this post:
I don't think embryos are people either. But what is the harm to the existing individuals if not the deprivation of their future wellbeing?
You say that the death is more of a harm because the existing people have interests in avoiding it. Would we accept that reasoning in the reverse scenario?
Suppose the world had become monstrously awful, such that it would be better for anyone to be dead rather than keep living. Then, a fire breaks out in a hospital. It will either destroy 100 embryos (suppose they are in artificial wombs, and we can be certain they will turn into people), or 5 babies. Wouldn't it be better if the fire destroyed the 100 embryos? After all, if it doesn't, 20x as many people will go on to lead horrible lives.
What if someone said "but the embryos don't yet have an interest in avoiding suffering, so we should prioritise the interests of existing people, and hope that the fire destroys the 5 babies". To me, that seems irrelevant.
So do you think there is maybe some kind of asymmetry here?
The fact that the embryos already exist is irrelevant. It would be just as bad if there were 100 unfertilized eggs that would soon be fertilized and develop into miserable people. We would have just as much reason to want those eggs to be destroyed in the fire. That's because the entirety of our reason here is our reason to want to prevent future miserable lives from coming to exist.
I discuss this asymmetry -- that we can (slightly) discount the benefit of coming into existence, relative to comparably-sized benefits to independently-existing people, but cannot similarly discount the harm of coming into (bad) existence -- in my paper, 'Rethinking the Asymmetry' (see the section on predictable regret): https://philpapers.org/rec/CHARTA-5
I never bothered to read up on anti-natalism, and after reading this I’m only thinking one thing: are their arguments really this terrible? Knowing your writing, Richard, I wouldn’t accuse you of grossly misrepresenting their views but by golly, if this is all there is to them, why on earth would anyone take them seriously?
My observation has been that some people have really miserable lives and then intuitively understand nothing to be better than any amount of potential harm.
One anti-natalist philosopher has a condition where he literally can’t feel happiness lol.
I mean the intuition for their axiom isn’t impossible to cultivate, it’s just very bizarre and contrary to your Humanity. Well, so is our society.
I'd argue that it's important to distinguish obligation from the question of what is a desierable outcome. But that may touch on deep differences we have in moral foundations.
I hope my last two paragraphs make clear that I distinguish obligation from what's good/desirable (and that I'm just talking about the latter here)?
Those certainly make it clear that you think it is wrong to compell people to do these things. But (perhaps unclearly) I meant seperate moral obligation "you ought to do X" from the claim that "the world would be better (in the morally relevant sense) if you did X." I guess the easiest way to realize this is just to accept a notion of the superogatory -- (though I had in mind something a bit more extreme than that..like taking most things to be superogatory).
I think it's really important to distinguish what we have most moral reason to do (which I take to go along with what would produce morally better outcomes) vs what others can reasonably expect or demand, or blame you for failing to do. I take supererogatory actions to be ones that you "ought" to do in the first sense without being required (in the second sense). I think a lot of good actions (including procreative ones) are supererogatory in this way -- not obligatory, but still very much worth doing!
Related: https://www.goodthoughts.blog/p/what-permissibility-could-be
Yes, I agree completely. Though I'd go further and deny there is any principled notion of "reasonably expect/demand" at all (in a moral sense obviously we fabricate social norms).
Agree with this rebuke of anti-natalism.
Somewhat disagree with the whole "there should be no pressure to have children". Feels like a hand-waving away of an uncomfortable conclusion. No--life being preferable over not-having-lived does necessarily constitute that people have an obligation to create more life. You disagree, why? Because of some deontological invocation of 'consent'/'bodily-autonomy'? As with vaccines, this is a poor and politically motivated argument. If it is for the greater good we can forgo consent. Consent is a proxy to what actually matters--not harming people, making people more happy. But by not having children you are quite literally depriving the world of happiness that would've been. This is harm, unless you accept Benatar's asymmetry.
This obligation, as with any healthy societal norm, should not be blindly dogmatically applied to every woman and applied without nuance. Polite lies like "women without children are just as equal as women with children" can be employed in proper social contexts as long as the underlying truth is implied by society, its culture and structures. Many women and men don't/won't have children and we shouldn't paint them as irredeemable villains. Being a worse person in a certain facet doesn't make you worth nothing. They are entirely capable of leading fulfilling lives. Worth less != worthless.
But we certainly should be a very pro-natal society. Relative to what we are now, we should be EXTREMELY pro-natal. Having children should be seen as a moral duty, much as it was in religious eras. This is a responsibility that must come with rights. Mothers need to be given far more social status than they are given right now. Men need to be made worthy of being fathers.
What's your view of kidney donation and other forms of extreme altruism?
We don't, in general, hold that people have a "moral duty" to do every good thing that they could conceivably do. Moreover, I think there are good reasons for that: personal autonomy is vital for people to be able to live their best lives. So I think (on consequentialist grounds) that we should be very wary of excessive or oppressive moral "pressure" on people to make pro-social decisions against their personal interests and inclinations. I think we should very strongly prefer to shape society in ways that *encourage* and *incentivize* people to make pro-social decisions, rather than bullying them into it.
I could understand someone disagreeing with this, and thinking that we need more across-the-board pressure to do good/altruistic things. I suspect that would be counterproductive, especially from a political or movement-building perspective (who wants to join the morality police? ick.). But I especially think it would be inconsistent to selectively claim a "duty" to engage in this one kind of altruism but not others (like kidney donation).
I’m not OP, but I felt compelled to reply.
The difference between your counterexamples and the pro-natalist view is that failing to encourage people to have children could ultimately lead to the collapse of society. Not donating a kidney or money to effective altruism doesn’t carry that kind of existential risk.
Also, a strong pro-natalist stance doesn’t require imposing duties or acting like a morality police. Think of it like society’s attitude toward smoking: you’re free to smoke, but most people agree it’s harmful. Over time, this consensus has led to a decline in smoking (setting aside the vaping trend).
To be clear, a strongly pro-natalist stance that avoids "imposing duties or acting like morality police" is precisely what I favor! See also:
https://www.goodthoughts.blog/p/a-human-abundance-agenda
That’s a good start. I sensed you had a position like that since you are obviously more pro than anti-natalist but I wanted to provide some stronger pro-natalist considerations.
I don’t really clearly understand the difference between “coercion” and “social norms”. Most people are just gonna fall in line with society—and I want society to be largely pro-natalist with a fair degree of moral urgency. The fact our world is currently quite anti-natalist in design and presentation means I must at least consider you directionally correct.
Sorry for not responding btw. Tbh, I *do* kinda think you have an obligation to donate a kidney if you’re in perfect health. I think a better healthy harmonious society would promote behavior like donating blood just instinctively. Not to mention animal ethics. Our world is quite rotten when you think about it, but morality is a matter of economics and I can chalk most of these ills up to insufficient luxury. Anti-natalism on the other hand is not a social ill we can simply “tolerate”.
As the other user @Yuyu said there is indeed a difference between donating a kidney and literally birthing the future generation. One will save society, one will not. But I don’t like to answer via deflection.
I feel that you have neglected the likelihood of certain individuals being born into a life with the near certainty of chronic illness, generational hardship, or mental health issues.
Also, I would like to critique your intro. Yes, children are often happy at a park or playground, but even for the children that have the privilege of that experience it is only a few hours of the week, and life extends far beyond childhood.
I cannot deny that for many the good in life does outweigh the bad, but for many it is quite the opposite. I personally have worked hard since setting out on my own to improve my life and I would say my quality of life is overall good now, but for several of the folks I know this is not the case.
In a more ideal world where opportunity presented itself equally to everyone regardless of their demographic, where exploitation wasn't rampant, where people took care of one another perhaps I would choose to have children, but that is simply not the world we live in.
People are greedy and although there are more than enough resources to go around they are hoarded and made a commodity. This is a complex topic all its own, but simply look at the decline in birth rates across the globe. People (women in particular) are choosing to not have babies, and it's not because they are selfish, but because their eyes are open as one of the most exploited demographics.
The main reasons I see any of my peers reproducing is because of societal pressure, ignorance, or because they are privileged enough to fulfill their desires of having a baby. Anyways, we all obviously have biases, but I wanted to present mine as food for thought in a rational manner without making anyone feel attacked or offended.
See footnote 1 - I agree that people who feel their lives are negative probably shouldn't reproduce! (But I think most people are overall happy to exist.)
On the explanation of declining birthrates, see the discussion of "opportunity costs" here: https://www.goodthoughts.blog/p/a-human-abundance-agenda
(People are wealthier and more free than ever before, so it doesn't make sense to posit increasing hardship, oppression, or exploitation, etc. as explaining the trend. Those bad things have objectively massively decreased over the past century. What has increased is our opportunity to do other valuable things with our time.)
What do you think about the embryo rescue case?
I don't think embryos are people, and I think there's a reasonable case for prioritizing the interests of existing people (esp. preventing *harm* to individuals) over the interests of possible people in coming into existence. See my discussion of "failing to create" in this post:
https://www.goodthoughts.blog/p/killing-vs-failing-to-create
I don't think embryos are people either. But what is the harm to the existing individuals if not the deprivation of their future wellbeing?
You say that the death is more of a harm because the existing people have interests in avoiding it. Would we accept that reasoning in the reverse scenario?
Suppose the world had become monstrously awful, such that it would be better for anyone to be dead rather than keep living. Then, a fire breaks out in a hospital. It will either destroy 100 embryos (suppose they are in artificial wombs, and we can be certain they will turn into people), or 5 babies. Wouldn't it be better if the fire destroyed the 100 embryos? After all, if it doesn't, 20x as many people will go on to lead horrible lives.
What if someone said "but the embryos don't yet have an interest in avoiding suffering, so we should prioritise the interests of existing people, and hope that the fire destroys the 5 babies". To me, that seems irrelevant.
So do you think there is maybe some kind of asymmetry here?
The fact that the embryos already exist is irrelevant. It would be just as bad if there were 100 unfertilized eggs that would soon be fertilized and develop into miserable people. We would have just as much reason to want those eggs to be destroyed in the fire. That's because the entirety of our reason here is our reason to want to prevent future miserable lives from coming to exist.
I discuss this asymmetry -- that we can (slightly) discount the benefit of coming into existence, relative to comparably-sized benefits to independently-existing people, but cannot similarly discount the harm of coming into (bad) existence -- in my paper, 'Rethinking the Asymmetry' (see the section on predictable regret): https://philpapers.org/rec/CHARTA-5