I non-ironically like the idea that IRBs should have to undergo a rigorous cost-benefit analysis before being set up. They do a lot of harm! Are there sufficient compensating benefits? It's super unclear.
One (rough) attempt at a answer: "the cost-benefit calculation looks like - save a tiny handful of people per year, while killing 10,000 to 100,000 more, for a price tag of $1.6 billion." Seems bad! But maybe someone else could make a stronger case for them?
Apr 24, 2023·edited Apr 24, 2023Liked by Richard Y Chappell
Point 5 on agent-neutrality vs. agent-relativity is interesting. Reminds me of Donald Regan's contention that "Evaluator-relative theories do not allow agents to give sincere moral advice." ("Against evaluator relativity" p. 107). I imagine this point is contested by evaluator-relative theorists. I'd be interested to see what they say. Does anyone has a reference for that?
I think there are some topics that are so controversial people don’t even want to have the meta-conversation and that is a problem. If we don’t have true beliefs about the world, we will make errors when trying to maximize welfare.
Certain facts, like how to make bio weapons, should be censored (in my view) but we can have that conversation openly and don’t need to deny that such weapons could exist.
There are probably some topics so dangerous that the meta-conversation can’t happen but usually this is probably overstated to suppress dissent.
"I do think it's essential to *default* to the assumption that one's interlocutors are operating in good faith. If I didn't have that default assumption, why shouldn't I just delete your comment, and those of anyone else who disagrees with me? "
You could just delete my comment of course, but if you do so simply because of disagreement, or not caring for what I have to say, or how I say it, while that's entirely your prerogative, it would be a different sort of judgement on your part, more about preference, or not wanting discomfit.
The reason the default assumption of good faith is problematic is simply this- not every person engages in discourse in good faith. I'll elaborate.
Every instance of discourse, however formal or informal, entails the expectation that each participant is engaging in the conversation according to the terms, the norms of that discourse event. The terms and norms might be explicit to some extent, but even in the most formalized types of discourse, there are implicit norms that operate as well. (This is the kind of thing that keeps sociolinguists employed.)
Now, my hope is, generally in the world, there are more individuals who conduct themselves, in whatever setting, in good faith, than bad faith actors. If not, we're really in trouble. But in any case, neither I, nor you, nor anyone else can immediately distinguish arguments presented in good faith from those presented in bad faith. Those acting in bad faith maintain the appearance of abiding by the terms and norms of discourse, as a means of accomplishing purposes that they not only are fully aware will be harmful to others, but the inflicting of harm is their ultimate purpose. The malign purpose is disguised. (The jargon and style of expression of academic disciplines are well-suited for this sort of malign purpose, for those so inclined.)
What to do?
Turns out, the advantages afforded to bad faith actors by universally presuming good faith are disproportionate to the disadvantages accrued by good faith actors who are not extended the benefit of the doubt at the outset. Good faith actors are not penalized by the requirement they establish their good faith over time, and through each instance of discourse they engage in. Their sincerity is not diminished, their earnest efforts to arrive at a point of shared understanding and mutual benefit are not hampered by withholding the assumption of good faith.
Bad faith actors, on the other hand, can camouflage, and disavow responsibility for, speech acts (oral or written) that are designed to cause harm to others- for instance, to create conditions where specific groups or individuals are threatened with violence, or erode support for programs that allow every person to participate fully in a public space. The bad faith actor can parrot the terms and norms of a discourse setting (like an academic discipline), as pretext, and in doing so seeks to inoculate themselves , and their contentions, from scrutiny.
The example of removing books from schools and libraries in Florida is particularly instructive in this regard. The purported basis is 'protecting children' from harmful material. The actual intended purpose is to privilege one cultural frame, and to eliminate any material that does not fit that frame (and terrorize anyone who might object with threats of incarceration, loss of profession, and the ubiquitous threat of violence by the more militant members of this subculture elevated by the authority of the state). These actions did not emerge from the void. They are the product of countless instances of bad faith discourse, over a long period of time, in multiple settings,-- including the halls of academia.
"When I read remarks in the "everything is just politics" style, I wonder why I should waste my time even reading it. By their own admission, they're only interested in manipulating me into sharing their political views."
Oh no!
To be exposed to a specific perspective, one you don't share, is an attempt at manipulation. Hmmm...
Well then, it certainly behooves you to not read it, or consider the implications for your own preferred premises. Disregard out of hand. Makes sense.
And argumentation in the form you do feel is worthy, that's *not* about persuasion?
This essay of yours is not attempting to persuade, to stake out a position? One that is, ironically, manifestly political, and about a political matter?
"...if we have any faith in the tendency of good arguments to eventually win out over bad ones (and if we don’t have such faith, what are we even doing in academia?)."
This is a problematic assumption, embedded in another problematic assumption.
Assumption #1 is that, by default, interlocutors operate in good faith, with the shared purpose of attaining shared understanding of matters under study, and the sought shared understanding will encompass the best available evidence and sound reasoning.
Since you mention your position is currently in Florida, I'll note that nothing about the efforts of the Desantis adminstration, and its allies, to dismantle public education at every level is based on a good faith belief that the education of Florida students will improve. The dismantling of public education in Florida by the Desantis regime is simply the use of threats against educators to eradicate any information and views deemed threatenting to the regime itself. These actions were, of course, foreshadowed by Desantis ordering the arrest of a public health statistician in her own home for the crime of compiling and making available accurate information about CoVid infections and death rates.
That is, the notion that debates about ideas (in some idealized abstract formulation) are generally pursued in good faith by all parties is not merely false, it is dangerously false. This premise serves to, or attempts to, occlude the manifest, and malign, intentions of any number of actors (some who hold tenure at public universities, or serve on governing boards). I encourage revisiting the origins of the term 'white-washing' in this regard. Not all who cloak themselves in the garb of the noble pursuit of knowledge through academic argumentation are in fact engaged in this noble pursuit. A fair reading of the history of higher education in the US and Europe tells us just the opposite, in fact, and the institutions themselves have laregly been instruments of promoting the worldview, interests (and professional prospects) of one demographic- cis gender hetero White males.
Assumption #2 is that academia exists, or should exist, as a separate space from the polis that constructs and maintains it.
Professional academics inhabit that space, and are largely entrusted to manage it, on behalf of the public that pays for it, and the students who seek an education within its confines. No part of our day to day life lies outside of the realm of politics, and how educational institutions are utilized by those on public payroll is, of course, subject to public scrutiny. The pretense of a rarefied atmosphere that surrounds academia, insulating it from the shabby business of the community at large, may suffice as some sort of emotional or ego salve, but it is nothing but a convenient fiction, especially for those who prefer to not be forthcoming about the ideological bases and purposes of their 'politically neutral' scholarly work. Either insufficient self-awareness and critical reflection, or disingenuousness, or perhaps both, is subserved by this fiction. In any event, any scholarly claim (especially some claim in moral philosophy!) is inextricably woven into the political setting in which it is promulgated, and emerges from the political framework of the individual espousing the claim. It suits the sensibilities of some to suggest otherwise, but that is again a display of bad faith, or at least a failure to recognize the sociopolitical nature of *every* idea. Surely a philosopher by trade should know better than to traffic in the mythology of politically neutral ideas and institutions.
With all that in mind, to even frame the whole concern as 'scholarly arguments about ideas' serves as obfuscation. The issue is *public statements*, and the harmful effects of public statements in publicly funded fora that are designed to effect harmful outcomes- to vilify, to denigrate, to harass, to obstruct, to incite.
It's 2023. Certainly we're not going to contend that words, written and spoken, bear no relation to the conduct the words are designed to prompt, are we?
re:1: I do think it's essential to *default* to the assumption that one's interlocutors are operating in good faith. If I didn't have that default assumption, why shouldn't I just delete your comment, and those of anyone else who disagrees with me? This dogmatic alternative would seem to make reasoned argument impossible.
Of course, default assumptions may be revised in the face of evidence. I certainly don't think that DeSantis & co. are operating in good faith. But no part of my argument relies on claiming otherwise.
re: 2: You haven't engaged at all with my argument that you're "making DeSantis’ case for him—why shouldn’t a political arena be under political control?"
tbh, I'm really only interested in intellectually engaging with other truth-seekers. When I read remarks in the "everything is just politics" style, I wonder why I should waste my time even reading it. By their own admission, they're only interested in manipulating me into sharing their political views. Why would I voluntarily expose myself to such propaganda? It's an incredibly self-defeating stance (and rhetorical style) to adopt.
Some of our most common moral prohibitions are of action types with unlawfulness/wrongfulness written into their very definition. The notion that there could be exceptions to these rules is incoherent.
For instance, it's a real question when if ever, and on what grounds, there is moral justification for *killing* someone. But there is no question when a moral justification obtains for *murdering* (unlawfully killing) someone.
I think morality and positive law can come apart. But if you mean to build *moral wrongness* into the definition, then the question instead becomes whether an act of apparent "murder" is actually murder at all, or rather the (morally justified but illegal) killing of an innocent person.
Yes, exactly! The question in relation to things like murder (and other morally charged kinds) is whether a given action should really count as an instance of that kind. And yes, I mean moral wrongness, and agree morality and positive law can come apart.
Btw, I was reacting to this line: “I’m not defending an absolutist view here: there are always conceivable exceptions to any rule.” Which you wrote in the context of discussing procedural rules having little to do with my example, of course.
But I think my point still raises an important question in relation to absolutism per se, and how we understand (absolute) prohibitions in morality in general. Pointing to the murder/killing distinction is just the easiest way to illustrate the point.
If a terrorist will detonate a bomb in a city killing a million people, unless I shoot an innocent person in the face, it sounds more accurate to call that shooting a morally justified murder, rather than to call it definitionally not a murder.
I agree, but as a purely terminological disagreement, it also doesn't really matter in the slightest, as long as people are clear about how *they're* using the term...
Hey, has anybody ever presented this paradox that just came to me?
Terrorist will blow up 1,000 people unless you kill someone immorally. Killing 1 to save 1,000 would be moral, but then it wouldn't satisfy the terrorist. So you would be killing someone without saving anyone, which would be immoral. This would satisfy the terrorist and save the 1,000 people. But then your killing would be moral...
I don't think your reply to Brennan & Freiman is that convincing. Sure, there are benefits to be had from engaging in moral philosophy, but it's not obvious that they outweigh the risk. On one side, we have Mill and Singer, but on the other side we have Karl Marx. And even an utilitarian can endorse risk aversion.
Though, if I had to guess, I'd say that academic moral philosophy is net positive today, largely due to animal ethics. And I certainly I wouldn't trust any "philosophical IRB" to improve this.
B&F's argument starts from the premise "if you are likely to commit a significant moral error when performing an activity, then you should avoid performing that activity." I argued that the premise is false: whether to perform the activity instead depends on whether the benefits outweigh the risks. That's enough to show that their argument fails.
It's a further question whether the benefits in fact outweigh the risks. I think they do (as, it seems, do you), for the sorts of reasons mentioned in footnote 1. But skepticism about the tendency of reasoned argument to do more good than harm in the long run is not really the target of my post. (What would be the point in even trying to argue against such a view? One's interlocutor would presumably ignore all arguments as more likely to be harmful than helpful! It's an intellectual black hole.)
I think that there should be IRB approval before you write your blog posts. What if we should valorize the void, and failing to do so is dangerous?
I non-ironically like the idea that IRBs should have to undergo a rigorous cost-benefit analysis before being set up. They do a lot of harm! Are there sufficient compensating benefits? It's super unclear.
One (rough) attempt at a answer: "the cost-benefit calculation looks like - save a tiny handful of people per year, while killing 10,000 to 100,000 more, for a price tag of $1.6 billion." Seems bad! But maybe someone else could make a stronger case for them?
https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/book-review-from-oversight-to-overkill?r=jitor&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
I agree! Just another example of pernicious status quo bias.
Point 5 on agent-neutrality vs. agent-relativity is interesting. Reminds me of Donald Regan's contention that "Evaluator-relative theories do not allow agents to give sincere moral advice." ("Against evaluator relativity" p. 107). I imagine this point is contested by evaluator-relative theorists. I'd be interested to see what they say. Does anyone has a reference for that?
I think there are some topics that are so controversial people don’t even want to have the meta-conversation and that is a problem. If we don’t have true beliefs about the world, we will make errors when trying to maximize welfare.
Certain facts, like how to make bio weapons, should be censored (in my view) but we can have that conversation openly and don’t need to deny that such weapons could exist.
There are probably some topics so dangerous that the meta-conversation can’t happen but usually this is probably overstated to suppress dissent.
"I do think it's essential to *default* to the assumption that one's interlocutors are operating in good faith. If I didn't have that default assumption, why shouldn't I just delete your comment, and those of anyone else who disagrees with me? "
You could just delete my comment of course, but if you do so simply because of disagreement, or not caring for what I have to say, or how I say it, while that's entirely your prerogative, it would be a different sort of judgement on your part, more about preference, or not wanting discomfit.
The reason the default assumption of good faith is problematic is simply this- not every person engages in discourse in good faith. I'll elaborate.
Every instance of discourse, however formal or informal, entails the expectation that each participant is engaging in the conversation according to the terms, the norms of that discourse event. The terms and norms might be explicit to some extent, but even in the most formalized types of discourse, there are implicit norms that operate as well. (This is the kind of thing that keeps sociolinguists employed.)
Now, my hope is, generally in the world, there are more individuals who conduct themselves, in whatever setting, in good faith, than bad faith actors. If not, we're really in trouble. But in any case, neither I, nor you, nor anyone else can immediately distinguish arguments presented in good faith from those presented in bad faith. Those acting in bad faith maintain the appearance of abiding by the terms and norms of discourse, as a means of accomplishing purposes that they not only are fully aware will be harmful to others, but the inflicting of harm is their ultimate purpose. The malign purpose is disguised. (The jargon and style of expression of academic disciplines are well-suited for this sort of malign purpose, for those so inclined.)
What to do?
Turns out, the advantages afforded to bad faith actors by universally presuming good faith are disproportionate to the disadvantages accrued by good faith actors who are not extended the benefit of the doubt at the outset. Good faith actors are not penalized by the requirement they establish their good faith over time, and through each instance of discourse they engage in. Their sincerity is not diminished, their earnest efforts to arrive at a point of shared understanding and mutual benefit are not hampered by withholding the assumption of good faith.
Bad faith actors, on the other hand, can camouflage, and disavow responsibility for, speech acts (oral or written) that are designed to cause harm to others- for instance, to create conditions where specific groups or individuals are threatened with violence, or erode support for programs that allow every person to participate fully in a public space. The bad faith actor can parrot the terms and norms of a discourse setting (like an academic discipline), as pretext, and in doing so seeks to inoculate themselves , and their contentions, from scrutiny.
The example of removing books from schools and libraries in Florida is particularly instructive in this regard. The purported basis is 'protecting children' from harmful material. The actual intended purpose is to privilege one cultural frame, and to eliminate any material that does not fit that frame (and terrorize anyone who might object with threats of incarceration, loss of profession, and the ubiquitous threat of violence by the more militant members of this subculture elevated by the authority of the state). These actions did not emerge from the void. They are the product of countless instances of bad faith discourse, over a long period of time, in multiple settings,-- including the halls of academia.
"When I read remarks in the "everything is just politics" style, I wonder why I should waste my time even reading it. By their own admission, they're only interested in manipulating me into sharing their political views."
Oh no!
To be exposed to a specific perspective, one you don't share, is an attempt at manipulation. Hmmm...
Well then, it certainly behooves you to not read it, or consider the implications for your own preferred premises. Disregard out of hand. Makes sense.
And argumentation in the form you do feel is worthy, that's *not* about persuasion?
This essay of yours is not attempting to persuade, to stake out a position? One that is, ironically, manifestly political, and about a political matter?
I guess I just read it wrong.
"...if we have any faith in the tendency of good arguments to eventually win out over bad ones (and if we don’t have such faith, what are we even doing in academia?)."
This is a problematic assumption, embedded in another problematic assumption.
Assumption #1 is that, by default, interlocutors operate in good faith, with the shared purpose of attaining shared understanding of matters under study, and the sought shared understanding will encompass the best available evidence and sound reasoning.
Since you mention your position is currently in Florida, I'll note that nothing about the efforts of the Desantis adminstration, and its allies, to dismantle public education at every level is based on a good faith belief that the education of Florida students will improve. The dismantling of public education in Florida by the Desantis regime is simply the use of threats against educators to eradicate any information and views deemed threatenting to the regime itself. These actions were, of course, foreshadowed by Desantis ordering the arrest of a public health statistician in her own home for the crime of compiling and making available accurate information about CoVid infections and death rates.
That is, the notion that debates about ideas (in some idealized abstract formulation) are generally pursued in good faith by all parties is not merely false, it is dangerously false. This premise serves to, or attempts to, occlude the manifest, and malign, intentions of any number of actors (some who hold tenure at public universities, or serve on governing boards). I encourage revisiting the origins of the term 'white-washing' in this regard. Not all who cloak themselves in the garb of the noble pursuit of knowledge through academic argumentation are in fact engaged in this noble pursuit. A fair reading of the history of higher education in the US and Europe tells us just the opposite, in fact, and the institutions themselves have laregly been instruments of promoting the worldview, interests (and professional prospects) of one demographic- cis gender hetero White males.
Assumption #2 is that academia exists, or should exist, as a separate space from the polis that constructs and maintains it.
Professional academics inhabit that space, and are largely entrusted to manage it, on behalf of the public that pays for it, and the students who seek an education within its confines. No part of our day to day life lies outside of the realm of politics, and how educational institutions are utilized by those on public payroll is, of course, subject to public scrutiny. The pretense of a rarefied atmosphere that surrounds academia, insulating it from the shabby business of the community at large, may suffice as some sort of emotional or ego salve, but it is nothing but a convenient fiction, especially for those who prefer to not be forthcoming about the ideological bases and purposes of their 'politically neutral' scholarly work. Either insufficient self-awareness and critical reflection, or disingenuousness, or perhaps both, is subserved by this fiction. In any event, any scholarly claim (especially some claim in moral philosophy!) is inextricably woven into the political setting in which it is promulgated, and emerges from the political framework of the individual espousing the claim. It suits the sensibilities of some to suggest otherwise, but that is again a display of bad faith, or at least a failure to recognize the sociopolitical nature of *every* idea. Surely a philosopher by trade should know better than to traffic in the mythology of politically neutral ideas and institutions.
With all that in mind, to even frame the whole concern as 'scholarly arguments about ideas' serves as obfuscation. The issue is *public statements*, and the harmful effects of public statements in publicly funded fora that are designed to effect harmful outcomes- to vilify, to denigrate, to harass, to obstruct, to incite.
It's 2023. Certainly we're not going to contend that words, written and spoken, bear no relation to the conduct the words are designed to prompt, are we?
Just sayin'.
re:1: I do think it's essential to *default* to the assumption that one's interlocutors are operating in good faith. If I didn't have that default assumption, why shouldn't I just delete your comment, and those of anyone else who disagrees with me? This dogmatic alternative would seem to make reasoned argument impossible.
Of course, default assumptions may be revised in the face of evidence. I certainly don't think that DeSantis & co. are operating in good faith. But no part of my argument relies on claiming otherwise.
re: 2: You haven't engaged at all with my argument that you're "making DeSantis’ case for him—why shouldn’t a political arena be under political control?"
tbh, I'm really only interested in intellectually engaging with other truth-seekers. When I read remarks in the "everything is just politics" style, I wonder why I should waste my time even reading it. By their own admission, they're only interested in manipulating me into sharing their political views. Why would I voluntarily expose myself to such propaganda? It's an incredibly self-defeating stance (and rhetorical style) to adopt.
Some of our most common moral prohibitions are of action types with unlawfulness/wrongfulness written into their very definition. The notion that there could be exceptions to these rules is incoherent.
For instance, it's a real question when if ever, and on what grounds, there is moral justification for *killing* someone. But there is no question when a moral justification obtains for *murdering* (unlawfully killing) someone.
I think morality and positive law can come apart. But if you mean to build *moral wrongness* into the definition, then the question instead becomes whether an act of apparent "murder" is actually murder at all, or rather the (morally justified but illegal) killing of an innocent person.
Not sure what any of this has to do with the OP.
Yes, exactly! The question in relation to things like murder (and other morally charged kinds) is whether a given action should really count as an instance of that kind. And yes, I mean moral wrongness, and agree morality and positive law can come apart.
Btw, I was reacting to this line: “I’m not defending an absolutist view here: there are always conceivable exceptions to any rule.” Which you wrote in the context of discussing procedural rules having little to do with my example, of course.
But I think my point still raises an important question in relation to absolutism per se, and how we understand (absolute) prohibitions in morality in general. Pointing to the murder/killing distinction is just the easiest way to illustrate the point.
If a terrorist will detonate a bomb in a city killing a million people, unless I shoot an innocent person in the face, it sounds more accurate to call that shooting a morally justified murder, rather than to call it definitionally not a murder.
I agree, but as a purely terminological disagreement, it also doesn't really matter in the slightest, as long as people are clear about how *they're* using the term...
Hey, has anybody ever presented this paradox that just came to me?
Terrorist will blow up 1,000 people unless you kill someone immorally. Killing 1 to save 1,000 would be moral, but then it wouldn't satisfy the terrorist. So you would be killing someone without saving anyone, which would be immoral. This would satisfy the terrorist and save the 1,000 people. But then your killing would be moral...
That's fun! Some structurally similar paradoxes discussed here: https://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/02/this-desire-is-thwarted.html
Not at all. That to me is a morally justified killing, and therefore *not murder*.
I don't think your reply to Brennan & Freiman is that convincing. Sure, there are benefits to be had from engaging in moral philosophy, but it's not obvious that they outweigh the risk. On one side, we have Mill and Singer, but on the other side we have Karl Marx. And even an utilitarian can endorse risk aversion.
Though, if I had to guess, I'd say that academic moral philosophy is net positive today, largely due to animal ethics. And I certainly I wouldn't trust any "philosophical IRB" to improve this.
B&F's argument starts from the premise "if you are likely to commit a significant moral error when performing an activity, then you should avoid performing that activity." I argued that the premise is false: whether to perform the activity instead depends on whether the benefits outweigh the risks. That's enough to show that their argument fails.
It's a further question whether the benefits in fact outweigh the risks. I think they do (as, it seems, do you), for the sorts of reasons mentioned in footnote 1. But skepticism about the tendency of reasoned argument to do more good than harm in the long run is not really the target of my post. (What would be the point in even trying to argue against such a view? One's interlocutor would presumably ignore all arguments as more likely to be harmful than helpful! It's an intellectual black hole.)