I personally like the idea of more good. And I accept this assertion as true: “The key point: EA is only asking for a modest subset of your ‘subagents’—far from all of them—to be guided by impartial beneficence.” But I also know that there have been hyperbolic EA advocates—or people who claim to wear the EA hat—who do sound like they are advocating for a destructive approach to some current systems, who do say out loud that everyone's moral claim is equal, and that therefore inequity must be corrected. And so the response to those advocates, whose extremism some find objectionable, might be “that sounds like rigid, programmatic utilitarianism—not merely a theoretical framework—and I have problems with that.” Related to that is another troublesome, practical question: who decides who benefits? And at whose expense? I know these are not new questions for utilitarianism, but they become immediately front and center in this context. They are implicitly entangled, so maybe not all “schmotte-and-bailey.”
So, by all means, in the pursuit of “more good,” let’s have the reasonable conversations that promote the greatest good, starting with how we define that. For me, JS Mill got it right (though I think liberty is more than mere method; it is also a benefit in and of itself), and too many modern utilitarians seem to have drifted from his synthesis. And some EA proponents sound downright hostile to the concept of individual liberty. I find their lack of faith in liberty troubling. And so it goes.
This is so loaded with moral presuppositions it’s hard to know where to start. Since when did morality and altruism have any demonstrated connection? People keep smuggling in moral assumptions as if they’re facts. Moral? Which moral? Whose moral? Good for whom, and for how long?
Morality is not a universal category. It’s not even a stable one. It’s a medieval invention with multiple competing versions — Christian, secular, utilitarian, Kantian, virtue‑ethical — none of which agree on what “good” is. So invoking “moral” or “altruistic” behaviour without specifying the system is meaningless.
Altruism isn’t moral by default. Morality doesn’t produce altruism, and altruism doesn’t require morality. There is no evidence of a necessary connection. People act altruistically for empathic, social, strategic, or emotional reasons — none of which require a moral framework.
If you want to make claims about “moral altruism,” you first have to answer:
Which moral?
Whose good?
Good for whom?
Good for how long?
And why should anyone obey that system’s commands?
Until those questions are answered, the argument collapses under its own presuppositions. I welcome pushback.
To keep discussion on-track, I prefer for comments to engage with the specific arguments of the post. If you disagree that one can talk about moral truths at all, that's an out-of-scope metaethical disagreement -- not really appropriate to bring up on a practical ethics post, since it isn't the topic of discussion that I'm trying to invite here. (You can just silently ignore posts like this if you don't think practical ethics makes any sense.)
I'm the arbiter of the kind of comments I welcome on my blog. You're very welcome to post whatever critiques you like on your own blog, but I'm not interested in hosting people who feel entitled to hijack my comment threads to their own ends.
>This is, I think, the exact opposite of what’s going on. EAs typically want to discuss, and get people on board with, moderate beneficentrism. That’s the ask — not anything like full-blown utilitarianism.
No. It’s a foot in the door. Now, I absolutely grasp that you may not realize that! But “please act according to my moral principles; it’s fine if you don’t accept them, so long as you embrace them in practice” isn’t a genuinely tenable position. If people act according to your moral principles, they will of course be drawn into your moral position—how could they not? They’re acting for the reasons you want them to! Perhaps only tepidly at first, but of course “at first” doesn’t remain “at first”; you’re certainly not going to say “okay, you gave $5 to the cause of helping shrimp—your moral duty is discharged; thanks, goodbye!” No, you’re going to say, “Yes, that was good, now of course you wish to do *more* good, right?” and so people get gradually roped into your moral worldview.
It’s as if a church said, “here, come help out with our church charity project. You’re not joining our religion, just doing a good thing!” And on the surface, that’s true. But now they know who you are, and will, unless you make a definite decision to break ties, continue to exert gentle pressure to bring you into the fold. That is, indeed, why these church charity projects exist, to a large extent.
This is just how humans *are*. They want those around them—everyone really—to share their moral values, and will use whatever means, subtle or overt, gentle or forceful, to do so.
Two points worth flagging in response to this slippery slope objection:
(1) Utilitarians don't "own" reasons of beneficence. In acting upon them, one could be acting according to the principles of any number of moral theories, including moderate (Rossian) deontology (which recognizes duties of beneficence) or virtue ethics (which recognizes benevolence as a virtue). EA itself includes plenty of non-utilitarians, so the shared "moral worldview" of the movement really is closer to beneficentrism than utilitarianism.
(2) If you're under the impression that I personally embody impartial utilitarianism in real life, I'm afraid I am not nearly so saintly! I give 10%. I know some people who give more (which I do regard as more ideal), but I've never felt pressured by them. I think the movement as a whole has coalesced around the 10% threshold as a "substantial without being *too* demanding" standard, and generally recognizes that it could be counterproductively off-putting to ask people to do more than that.
(2) is irrelevant. Many Christians do not follow the Bible with utter faithfulness; that does not prevent them from proselytizing!
But (1), I feel, is dodging the question. *Why* do you want people to behave in ways that are, in your view, beneficent? Because of your moral beliefs! Sure, you’re fine if they do things that you like for other reasons, and I’m not suggesting that your desire for people to do so is wholly cynical (or consciously cynical at all). But—well, if you draw a trend line between points, and it points in a given direction, I think people can be easily forgiven for thinking that, if they add their own point to that line, it will contribute to the line reaching the place it’s pointing toward! And that, even if it is not consciously intended, those advocating doing so certainly wouldn’t *object* if it just so happened to get there!
To put it perhaps more clearly, when a person contributes to a movement which is based on moral premises which, if carried to their logical conclusion, would result in consequences that person would find pernicious, it’s really a disingenuous response to say, “*this* thing that we’re asking you do do won’t *necessarily* contribute to that; you’re just being a good person!”
Like…if a stalwart anti-abortion group asked you to contribute to an effort they’re spearheading (or just promoting) that, I dunno, funded foster parents or something, I don’t think it would take too much convincing for you to feel that doing so might actually contribute to making the world *worse* in your view, even if there’s nothing obviously wrong with the particular effort in question (if you don’t have a problem with anti-abortionism, substitute some other cause you oppose). No?
Do you not recognize the possibility of umbrella coalitions? That's what I take EA to be: a coalition of people who give *at least* a certain amount of weight to impartial beneficence (and noticeably more than people typically act upon). Some of us endorse this as part of a broader utilitarian view. Others, as I've already explained, endorse it for ultimately non-utilitarian reasons, and indeed outright reject utilitarianism. We nonetheless find that we overlap sufficiently on certain core values that it makes sense for us to work together to promote them, and so those *common* values are the ones that become enshrined in the movement.
So I just think it is false to claim that utilitarianism is the "logical conclusion" to which the moral premises of EA "carry" one. (Compare: some libertarians are Randians, but you don't have to be, and it would be false to claim that Randianism is the "logical conclusion" to which libertarianism carries you.)
>some libertarians are Randians, but you don't have to be, and it would be false to claim that Randianism is the "logical conclusion" to which libertarianism carries you.
Alright, let’s go here, as I think this can shed light on the issue. First, Rand would wholeheartedly disagree. She would *absolutely* claim that Objectivism is the necessary logical and moral conclusion of even the most tepid of libertarianism (and I think the analogy with utilitarianism here is a good one, as to my understanding, hardcore utilitarians would say something analogous about the logical and moral necessity of their beliefs). And Objectivists within libertarianism would, presumably, attempt to use their foothold within libertarianism to nudge libertarians and proto-libertarians toward Objectivism based on that premise.
Indeed, this is how libertarianism itself works! People interested in liberty who poke their nose into the movement are often drawn deeper and deeper into the ideology (this meme is pretty frequently shared: https://x.com/ProLifeLiberty/status/1789105033306677629/photo/1). And…we’re okay with that! Sure, if people (say, Progressives) want to cooperate with libertarians to promote commonly-held goals, great! But it would sure be nice if the association managed to rub some libertarian values off on those people, to grow the movement and move toward a freer world.
And, importantly, *this is what tends to happen, whether people intend it or not.* Not just with libertarianism, but with movements and cultures in general. So if the core of EA is hardcore utilitarians who do in fact believe that “every sentient being, across every place and time, holds the same moral claim on every other” or something like it, they are naturally going to try—subtly, even unconsciously—to move both EA itself and the world in general toward a general acceptance of that ethos. And if making that clear would hinder the progress toward that goal, they’re going to be happy to be close-mouthed about their ultimate ends.
EA is not really an “umbrella organization” of the sort you imply, to my understanding. I am *not* up on the history of EA, so correct me if I’m wrong, but EA, to my understanding, was not formed by disparate organizations/groups with disparate philosophical views coming together to implement a limited set of common goals. Instead, it formed around the ideas of Peter Singer, who really *is* a hardcore-utilitarian-style figure. This would be like if the Libertarian Party had been formed by Rothbard, who had said, “sure, pragmatists, come on into the LP, everyone’s welcome!” when in fact we know that Rothbardians are hardcore ideologues who don’t even recognize non-Rothbardians as libertarians. Pragmatists would, in this example, merely be “useful idiots."
I am, critically, not saying that your critics are simply right, and that you are being either disingenuous or tricked, and there’s the kind of intentional motte-and-bailey approach going on in EA (as is genuinely the case for other movements, e.g. feminism). I am, instead, saying two things. One, your critics have some serious justification to be extremely wary of the motivations here, as this sort of thing is pretty central to human nature, and a movement like EA would have to put in significant Schelling fences to ensure that this slope did *not* get slipped down, which to my (limited) knowledge they have not done. And two, I think you severely underestimate the degree to which basic human nature (including your own!) tends to push things toward the very situation you say is not happening.
And this is what’s frustrating about discussions like this. This will never be resolved, agreement will not be come to, and things will just hang there. Sigh.
I personally like the idea of more good. And I accept this assertion as true: “The key point: EA is only asking for a modest subset of your ‘subagents’—far from all of them—to be guided by impartial beneficence.” But I also know that there have been hyperbolic EA advocates—or people who claim to wear the EA hat—who do sound like they are advocating for a destructive approach to some current systems, who do say out loud that everyone's moral claim is equal, and that therefore inequity must be corrected. And so the response to those advocates, whose extremism some find objectionable, might be “that sounds like rigid, programmatic utilitarianism—not merely a theoretical framework—and I have problems with that.” Related to that is another troublesome, practical question: who decides who benefits? And at whose expense? I know these are not new questions for utilitarianism, but they become immediately front and center in this context. They are implicitly entangled, so maybe not all “schmotte-and-bailey.”
So, by all means, in the pursuit of “more good,” let’s have the reasonable conversations that promote the greatest good, starting with how we define that. For me, JS Mill got it right (though I think liberty is more than mere method; it is also a benefit in and of itself), and too many modern utilitarians seem to have drifted from his synthesis. And some EA proponents sound downright hostile to the concept of individual liberty. I find their lack of faith in liberty troubling. And so it goes.
Sadly, easily defensible views don't get much traction, since we humans seem to be attracted to drama
This is so loaded with moral presuppositions it’s hard to know where to start. Since when did morality and altruism have any demonstrated connection? People keep smuggling in moral assumptions as if they’re facts. Moral? Which moral? Whose moral? Good for whom, and for how long?
Morality is not a universal category. It’s not even a stable one. It’s a medieval invention with multiple competing versions — Christian, secular, utilitarian, Kantian, virtue‑ethical — none of which agree on what “good” is. So invoking “moral” or “altruistic” behaviour without specifying the system is meaningless.
Altruism isn’t moral by default. Morality doesn’t produce altruism, and altruism doesn’t require morality. There is no evidence of a necessary connection. People act altruistically for empathic, social, strategic, or emotional reasons — none of which require a moral framework.
If you want to make claims about “moral altruism,” you first have to answer:
Which moral?
Whose good?
Good for whom?
Good for how long?
And why should anyone obey that system’s commands?
Until those questions are answered, the argument collapses under its own presuppositions. I welcome pushback.
Dude please don't infect Substack with AI-generated drivel.
If I want to argue with ChatGPT I'd do it on my own account thanks
To keep discussion on-track, I prefer for comments to engage with the specific arguments of the post. If you disagree that one can talk about moral truths at all, that's an out-of-scope metaethical disagreement -- not really appropriate to bring up on a practical ethics post, since it isn't the topic of discussion that I'm trying to invite here. (You can just silently ignore posts like this if you don't think practical ethics makes any sense.)
I'm the arbiter of the kind of comments I welcome on my blog. You're very welcome to post whatever critiques you like on your own blog, but I'm not interested in hosting people who feel entitled to hijack my comment threads to their own ends.
>This is, I think, the exact opposite of what’s going on. EAs typically want to discuss, and get people on board with, moderate beneficentrism. That’s the ask — not anything like full-blown utilitarianism.
No. It’s a foot in the door. Now, I absolutely grasp that you may not realize that! But “please act according to my moral principles; it’s fine if you don’t accept them, so long as you embrace them in practice” isn’t a genuinely tenable position. If people act according to your moral principles, they will of course be drawn into your moral position—how could they not? They’re acting for the reasons you want them to! Perhaps only tepidly at first, but of course “at first” doesn’t remain “at first”; you’re certainly not going to say “okay, you gave $5 to the cause of helping shrimp—your moral duty is discharged; thanks, goodbye!” No, you’re going to say, “Yes, that was good, now of course you wish to do *more* good, right?” and so people get gradually roped into your moral worldview.
It’s as if a church said, “here, come help out with our church charity project. You’re not joining our religion, just doing a good thing!” And on the surface, that’s true. But now they know who you are, and will, unless you make a definite decision to break ties, continue to exert gentle pressure to bring you into the fold. That is, indeed, why these church charity projects exist, to a large extent.
This is just how humans *are*. They want those around them—everyone really—to share their moral values, and will use whatever means, subtle or overt, gentle or forceful, to do so.
Two points worth flagging in response to this slippery slope objection:
(1) Utilitarians don't "own" reasons of beneficence. In acting upon them, one could be acting according to the principles of any number of moral theories, including moderate (Rossian) deontology (which recognizes duties of beneficence) or virtue ethics (which recognizes benevolence as a virtue). EA itself includes plenty of non-utilitarians, so the shared "moral worldview" of the movement really is closer to beneficentrism than utilitarianism.
(2) If you're under the impression that I personally embody impartial utilitarianism in real life, I'm afraid I am not nearly so saintly! I give 10%. I know some people who give more (which I do regard as more ideal), but I've never felt pressured by them. I think the movement as a whole has coalesced around the 10% threshold as a "substantial without being *too* demanding" standard, and generally recognizes that it could be counterproductively off-putting to ask people to do more than that.
(2) is irrelevant. Many Christians do not follow the Bible with utter faithfulness; that does not prevent them from proselytizing!
But (1), I feel, is dodging the question. *Why* do you want people to behave in ways that are, in your view, beneficent? Because of your moral beliefs! Sure, you’re fine if they do things that you like for other reasons, and I’m not suggesting that your desire for people to do so is wholly cynical (or consciously cynical at all). But—well, if you draw a trend line between points, and it points in a given direction, I think people can be easily forgiven for thinking that, if they add their own point to that line, it will contribute to the line reaching the place it’s pointing toward! And that, even if it is not consciously intended, those advocating doing so certainly wouldn’t *object* if it just so happened to get there!
To put it perhaps more clearly, when a person contributes to a movement which is based on moral premises which, if carried to their logical conclusion, would result in consequences that person would find pernicious, it’s really a disingenuous response to say, “*this* thing that we’re asking you do do won’t *necessarily* contribute to that; you’re just being a good person!”
Like…if a stalwart anti-abortion group asked you to contribute to an effort they’re spearheading (or just promoting) that, I dunno, funded foster parents or something, I don’t think it would take too much convincing for you to feel that doing so might actually contribute to making the world *worse* in your view, even if there’s nothing obviously wrong with the particular effort in question (if you don’t have a problem with anti-abortionism, substitute some other cause you oppose). No?
Do you not recognize the possibility of umbrella coalitions? That's what I take EA to be: a coalition of people who give *at least* a certain amount of weight to impartial beneficence (and noticeably more than people typically act upon). Some of us endorse this as part of a broader utilitarian view. Others, as I've already explained, endorse it for ultimately non-utilitarian reasons, and indeed outright reject utilitarianism. We nonetheless find that we overlap sufficiently on certain core values that it makes sense for us to work together to promote them, and so those *common* values are the ones that become enshrined in the movement.
So I just think it is false to claim that utilitarianism is the "logical conclusion" to which the moral premises of EA "carry" one. (Compare: some libertarians are Randians, but you don't have to be, and it would be false to claim that Randianism is the "logical conclusion" to which libertarianism carries you.)
>some libertarians are Randians, but you don't have to be, and it would be false to claim that Randianism is the "logical conclusion" to which libertarianism carries you.
Alright, let’s go here, as I think this can shed light on the issue. First, Rand would wholeheartedly disagree. She would *absolutely* claim that Objectivism is the necessary logical and moral conclusion of even the most tepid of libertarianism (and I think the analogy with utilitarianism here is a good one, as to my understanding, hardcore utilitarians would say something analogous about the logical and moral necessity of their beliefs). And Objectivists within libertarianism would, presumably, attempt to use their foothold within libertarianism to nudge libertarians and proto-libertarians toward Objectivism based on that premise.
Indeed, this is how libertarianism itself works! People interested in liberty who poke their nose into the movement are often drawn deeper and deeper into the ideology (this meme is pretty frequently shared: https://x.com/ProLifeLiberty/status/1789105033306677629/photo/1). And…we’re okay with that! Sure, if people (say, Progressives) want to cooperate with libertarians to promote commonly-held goals, great! But it would sure be nice if the association managed to rub some libertarian values off on those people, to grow the movement and move toward a freer world.
And, importantly, *this is what tends to happen, whether people intend it or not.* Not just with libertarianism, but with movements and cultures in general. So if the core of EA is hardcore utilitarians who do in fact believe that “every sentient being, across every place and time, holds the same moral claim on every other” or something like it, they are naturally going to try—subtly, even unconsciously—to move both EA itself and the world in general toward a general acceptance of that ethos. And if making that clear would hinder the progress toward that goal, they’re going to be happy to be close-mouthed about their ultimate ends.
EA is not really an “umbrella organization” of the sort you imply, to my understanding. I am *not* up on the history of EA, so correct me if I’m wrong, but EA, to my understanding, was not formed by disparate organizations/groups with disparate philosophical views coming together to implement a limited set of common goals. Instead, it formed around the ideas of Peter Singer, who really *is* a hardcore-utilitarian-style figure. This would be like if the Libertarian Party had been formed by Rothbard, who had said, “sure, pragmatists, come on into the LP, everyone’s welcome!” when in fact we know that Rothbardians are hardcore ideologues who don’t even recognize non-Rothbardians as libertarians. Pragmatists would, in this example, merely be “useful idiots."
I am, critically, not saying that your critics are simply right, and that you are being either disingenuous or tricked, and there’s the kind of intentional motte-and-bailey approach going on in EA (as is genuinely the case for other movements, e.g. feminism). I am, instead, saying two things. One, your critics have some serious justification to be extremely wary of the motivations here, as this sort of thing is pretty central to human nature, and a movement like EA would have to put in significant Schelling fences to ensure that this slope did *not* get slipped down, which to my (limited) knowledge they have not done. And two, I think you severely underestimate the degree to which basic human nature (including your own!) tends to push things toward the very situation you say is not happening.
And this is what’s frustrating about discussions like this. This will never be resolved, agreement will not be come to, and things will just hang there. Sigh.