Very sensible post. I've recently had a similar but kind of reversed question about classical theism (which I've been exposed to a lot at Notre Dame and the Catholic-dominated programs I've been at over the past few years). Since classical theism has it that God and the good are identical, and I believe in the good (I'm a moral realist), it seems at least possible that classical theism should have it that I'm already a theist, and only sort of mistakenly take myself to be an agnostic.
Some respond that an all-good, all-loving being like God would not or could not command such an action.[10] But that is likely to again reject DCT in favor of thinking that some actions are just wrong, pretty much no matter what: that’s why God could not or would not command them.[11]
Some deeper questions: why would God have a loving character rather than a “hating” character? Why would a loving being command some actions and not others? Again:
either there are reasons or not.[12]
If there are no reasons, then God’s being loving is arbitrary—God could have had an evil character. To many, this isn’t plausible.
But if there are reasons, is it because it is just good to be loving—perhaps because being loving promotes happiness, respect, and fairness? If so, then some things are good and bad, or right and wrong independently of God’s commands: so DCT is false.
You are just presupposing that Thomism is false! If Thomism is right, then we can know a priori (via the De Ente argument and conceptual analysis) that God is necessarily non-vacuously good. Because He is existence itself and existence is convertible with Goodness. So no, the Euthyphro dilemma doesn't re-arise for the essence of God if classical theism is true - this is essentially uncontroversial among people informed on the topic.
God could be necessarily non-vacuously good if we have an independent grasp on the property of goodness. If there's no independent property, then I don't see how labeling the view "Thomism" or calling it "uncontroversial" addresses the argument I gave. What are you attributing that's different from self-identity?
Sorry, I assumed that a philosophy professor knew what Thomism entails. Apparently not, though - which, on second thought, isn't surprising.
If Thomism is correct, then "X is good for a creature of kind Y" is equivalent to "X actualises the creature qua Y-ness". You can a priori see what kind of creature He has made you, therefore you can a priori see what is good for you and what is good for you is independently rooted in Him. How on Earth is there supposed to be any dilemma? There is none, as essentially everyone well-read on the literature agrees.
I don't see how that connects up to anything I wrote. To be as explicit as possible:
1. Either God’s nature matches a standard of goodness that we can grasp independently of any commitment to theism, or God’s essential nature, whatever that turns out to be, provides the substantive content of “goodness”.
2. If the former, then morality isn't grounded in theism (though theism may still be independently true).
3. If the latter, then attributing "goodness" to God is vacuous: it rules out no conceivable scenarios about what God prefers.
Can you clarify which of these three claims you reject (and why)?
I reject 2 because atheists can know what kind of creature they are despite not being aware that He makes them the kind of creature they are, and this tells us nothing about the grounding of morality.
The argument is incredibly confused because it mixes metaphysics and epistemology: Even if it were true that you could only know what is good for you if you are a theist, then NOTHING WHATSOEVER would follow from it when it comes to the grounding of what is in fact good for you. Again, this is an utterly trivial point.
Thanks for clarifying your view! I do explain a bit in footnote 1 (and the links provided therein) why I think there are important connections between metaphysics and epistemology. But it doesn't sound like you're enjoying the conversation much so I'm happy to leave it there.
Yeah I guess I was kinda vague. I mean something like a theistic neo-Aristotelian/Thomist metaethics that sees morality as based on true claims about human nature and flourishing, but attribute this to God's design.
As an analogy, it's wrong to put diesel in my Hyundai, not just because Hyundai says so in the owners manual, but Hyundai is the author of the command and the designer of the car, so it's describing what is good for the car. I think this avoids the problem of the vacuous God=good self-identical attribution. But it might not avoid the substantive question argument.
(1) Is "human nature and flourishing" determined by our current intrinsic properties (i.e. independent of the historical supposition that God designed or created humanity)? If so, then I'd consider that a view on which the fundamental moral truths are independent of God, even if it's true that God's design was historically or causally responsible for our having the particular nature that we have. God could tell us the independent moral truths, and they'd still be independent in the relevant (metaphysical) sense.
If, on the other hand, God's *historical intentions* play an ineliminable role in determining our nature/flourishing, then I'd worry about arbitrariness worries arising again. (Could he intend for us to suffer, for example, and thereby make that a component of human "flourishing"?)
(2) On any descriptive characterization of a creature's "nature", it does seem an open question whether acting on that nature is actually good. For example, if humans had evolved (or were designed to possess) scorpion-like tails with which to poison our rivals, I don't think that would suffice to make poisoning our rivals a good thing.
(3) What content does this account give to 'goodness' when attributed to God himself? If it's just saying that he acts according to his nature, then that still sounds pretty vacuous to me.
P.S. You might also find Dominik's comments of interest — he's very confident that the concerns I'm raising don't apply to Thomism, though I wasn't personally convinced by his comments.
Very sensible post. I've recently had a similar but kind of reversed question about classical theism (which I've been exposed to a lot at Notre Dame and the Catholic-dominated programs I've been at over the past few years). Since classical theism has it that God and the good are identical, and I believe in the good (I'm a moral realist), it seems at least possible that classical theism should have it that I'm already a theist, and only sort of mistakenly take myself to be an agnostic.
I say or suggest the same thing here:
4. God’s Character
Some respond that an all-good, all-loving being like God would not or could not command such an action.[10] But that is likely to again reject DCT in favor of thinking that some actions are just wrong, pretty much no matter what: that’s why God could not or would not command them.[11]
Some deeper questions: why would God have a loving character rather than a “hating” character? Why would a loving being command some actions and not others? Again:
either there are reasons or not.[12]
If there are no reasons, then God’s being loving is arbitrary—God could have had an evil character. To many, this isn’t plausible.
But if there are reasons, is it because it is just good to be loving—perhaps because being loving promotes happiness, respect, and fairness? If so, then some things are good and bad, or right and wrong independently of God’s commands: so DCT is false.
https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/
You are just presupposing that Thomism is false! If Thomism is right, then we can know a priori (via the De Ente argument and conceptual analysis) that God is necessarily non-vacuously good. Because He is existence itself and existence is convertible with Goodness. So no, the Euthyphro dilemma doesn't re-arise for the essence of God if classical theism is true - this is essentially uncontroversial among people informed on the topic.
God could be necessarily non-vacuously good if we have an independent grasp on the property of goodness. If there's no independent property, then I don't see how labeling the view "Thomism" or calling it "uncontroversial" addresses the argument I gave. What are you attributing that's different from self-identity?
Sorry, I assumed that a philosophy professor knew what Thomism entails. Apparently not, though - which, on second thought, isn't surprising.
If Thomism is correct, then "X is good for a creature of kind Y" is equivalent to "X actualises the creature qua Y-ness". You can a priori see what kind of creature He has made you, therefore you can a priori see what is good for you and what is good for you is independently rooted in Him. How on Earth is there supposed to be any dilemma? There is none, as essentially everyone well-read on the literature agrees.
I don't see how that connects up to anything I wrote. To be as explicit as possible:
1. Either God’s nature matches a standard of goodness that we can grasp independently of any commitment to theism, or God’s essential nature, whatever that turns out to be, provides the substantive content of “goodness”.
2. If the former, then morality isn't grounded in theism (though theism may still be independently true).
3. If the latter, then attributing "goodness" to God is vacuous: it rules out no conceivable scenarios about what God prefers.
Can you clarify which of these three claims you reject (and why)?
I reject 2 because atheists can know what kind of creature they are despite not being aware that He makes them the kind of creature they are, and this tells us nothing about the grounding of morality.
The argument is incredibly confused because it mixes metaphysics and epistemology: Even if it were true that you could only know what is good for you if you are a theist, then NOTHING WHATSOEVER would follow from it when it comes to the grounding of what is in fact good for you. Again, this is an utterly trivial point.
Thanks for clarifying your view! I do explain a bit in footnote 1 (and the links provided therein) why I think there are important connections between metaphysics and epistemology. But it doesn't sound like you're enjoying the conversation much so I'm happy to leave it there.
Footnote 1 addresses divine command theorists, which is the exact opposite of Thomistic natural law! But I am very happy to leave it here, too.
Interesting post. How does this apply to theistic moral naturalism?
Sorry, you'll have to explain what you have in mind by "theistic moral naturalism"?
Yeah I guess I was kinda vague. I mean something like a theistic neo-Aristotelian/Thomist metaethics that sees morality as based on true claims about human nature and flourishing, but attribute this to God's design.
As an analogy, it's wrong to put diesel in my Hyundai, not just because Hyundai says so in the owners manual, but Hyundai is the author of the command and the designer of the car, so it's describing what is good for the car. I think this avoids the problem of the vacuous God=good self-identical attribution. But it might not avoid the substantive question argument.
It might depend on a few further questions:
(1) Is "human nature and flourishing" determined by our current intrinsic properties (i.e. independent of the historical supposition that God designed or created humanity)? If so, then I'd consider that a view on which the fundamental moral truths are independent of God, even if it's true that God's design was historically or causally responsible for our having the particular nature that we have. God could tell us the independent moral truths, and they'd still be independent in the relevant (metaphysical) sense.
If, on the other hand, God's *historical intentions* play an ineliminable role in determining our nature/flourishing, then I'd worry about arbitrariness worries arising again. (Could he intend for us to suffer, for example, and thereby make that a component of human "flourishing"?)
(2) On any descriptive characterization of a creature's "nature", it does seem an open question whether acting on that nature is actually good. For example, if humans had evolved (or were designed to possess) scorpion-like tails with which to poison our rivals, I don't think that would suffice to make poisoning our rivals a good thing.
(3) What content does this account give to 'goodness' when attributed to God himself? If it's just saying that he acts according to his nature, then that still sounds pretty vacuous to me.
P.S. You might also find Dominik's comments of interest — he's very confident that the concerns I'm raising don't apply to Thomism, though I wasn't personally convinced by his comments.
Thanks for the thoughtful response. Will check out Dominck's comments and the normative property dualism paper you suggest in the linked article.
Why are you posting AI generated text?